時間：2019年10月23日（周三下午），15:00-17:05

地點：學院南路學術會堂603會議室

研讨會詳細議程：

15:30-16:30

報告一：Earnings Management via Not-wholly-owned Subsidiaries

報告人：張新一（清華大學）

摘要：We explore a new mechanism of earnings management whereby a parent company shifts income from not-wholly-owned subsidiaries to itself to avoid losses. Consolidated net income attributable to the parent company increases if earnings are shifted from not-wholly-owned subsidiaries to the parent, as the parent company enjoys the full amount of earnings shifted rather than sharing earnings with minority investors. In general, net income and noncontrolling interest in subsidiary earnings exhibit a strong positive correlation, suggesting that a firm’s earnings performance tends to co-move with its subsidiaries’ earnings. However, this positive relation turns significantly negative for firms just meeting or beating zero earnings, indicating that firms opportunistically decrease earnings of not-wholly-owned subsidiaries to manage consolidated net income to avoid losses. Income shifting from subsidiaries to the parent firm is mainly driven by firms with a very large percentage of noncontrolling ownership. In addition, related-party transactions and concurrent appointment of a parent’s top management member to subsidiaries’ management team play a complementary role in facilitating such income shifting. Overall, our evidence not only demonstrates a new mechanism of earnings management via not-wholly-owned subsidiaries, but also highlights the negative consequences to minority investors of income shifting from subsidiaries to the publicly listed company.

16:35-17:35

報告二：Does the One-Child Policy Impede Innovation in China? Evidence from a Regression Discontinuity Design

報告人：唐菂（廈門大學）

摘要：We analyze how the one-child policy (OCP) in China affects firm innovation. The OCP was intensively enforced from January 1980, causing a sharp increase in the single-child ratio among CEOs just born after this policy cutoff. Exploiting this discontinuity and using a Regression Discontinuity Design framework, we find that single-child CEOs lead to significant decreases in firm innovation. A separate, difference-in-differences analysis around the CEO turnover confirms this finding. We find that single-child CEOs are less willing to take risks by making significant R&D investments. Our findings indicate that radical population control policy impede innovation in China.

報告人簡介：

張新一，清華大學經濟管理學院會計學博士研究生，在學期間曾赴美國南加州大學Leventhal會計學院訪學。研究方向為會計信息與資本市場、公司治理。曾在《管理世界》等期刊發表過論文。

唐菂，廈門大學管理學院财務學系博士研究生，佛羅裡達州立大學聯合培養博士。研究方向為公司财務、公司治理、企業創新、企業并購、以及社交媒體。曾在《經濟研究》期刊發表論文。