時間：2020年12月10日（周四上午），10:00-12:00  

 

地點：騰訊APP會議（會議号：請有意向參加的博士生和老師聯系趙瑩老師獲取）

 

 

 

研讨會詳細議程：10:00-11:00  

 

報告：Short-Selling Pressure and Corporate Tax Aggressiveness

 

報告人：彭章

 

 

 

摘要：We study how short-selling pressure affects tax aggressiveness using the pilot program on short sales in Regulation SHO. Using a difference-in-differences approach, we find that higher short-selling pressure significantly reduces tax aggressiveness. To explain the reduction, we offer a simple agency-theoretic model and provide evidence that when short-selling pressure increases, the likelihood of detecting questionable tax shelters increases, discouraging tax aggressiveness. Corroborating this evidence, we also find stronger (weaker) effects of short-selling pressure on firms subject to fewer (more) audits by the IRS before the pilot program. These findings suggest that short-sellers help reduce aggressive tax avoidance schemes.

 

.

 

報告人簡介：

 

彭章，清華大學經濟管理學院金融系博士研究生，本科畢業于浙江大學經濟學院金融系，2018年8月-2019年12月于密歇根大學安娜堡分校羅斯商學院訪學。研究方向為公司金融、公司治理、勞動與金融、機器學習在公司金融的應用、金融科技。已發表論文4篇，分别發表于《管理科學學報》、《投資研究》（2篇）、《浙江社會科學》。工作論文8篇，一篇于《金融研究》二審修改中，一篇于《南開管理評論》三審修改中，一篇投至Journal of Accounting Research.  

 

 

 

研讨會詳細議程：11：00-12:00  

 

報告：The Effects of Pre-trade Disclosure Regulation on Insider Trading: Evidence from the China A-share Market

 

報告人：郭凱

 

 

 

摘要：Since June 2017, directors, supervisors, and senior executives of the China A-share firms have been required to disclose their share sale plans before they can sell shares. In this paper, we use this unique setting to investigate how this pre-trade disclosure requirement affects insider trading. We find that the market reacts negatively to the announcements of sale plans and market reactions to sale plans are positively associated with future earnings information, suggesting that the announcements of sale plans enable the market to infer insiders’ information. We also find that insiders make fewer information-driven insider sales in the post-reform period. Finally, there is evidence that stock prices become less efficient after this regulation. Overall, the findings suggest that the pre-trade disclosure regulation reduces the volume of informed insider sales at the expense of stock price informativeness.

 

報告人簡介：

 

郭凱，新加坡國立大學會計學博士研究生。研究方向為公司治理，公司披露，内部人交易和公共監管。