時間：2020年4月17日（周五上午），9:00 – 10:30

地點：矚目APP會議（會議号：請有意向參加的博士生和老師聯系趙瑩老師獲取）

研讨會詳細議程：

9:00 – 10:30

報告題目：The value of pre-contract information about an agent’s ability in the presence of moral hazard and adverse

報告人：Shaopeng Li (Temple University)

摘要：We analyze the expected value of information about an agent’s type in the presence of moral hazard and adverse selection. Information about the agent’s type enables the principal to sort/screen agents of different types. The value of the information decreases in the variability of output and the agent’s risk aversion, two factors that are typically associated with the severity of the moral hazard problem. However, the value of the information about agent type first increases but ultimately decreases in the severity of adverse selection. The decrease comes about because the means available to the principal to induce effort—namely, the pay–performance sensitivity—must also be used to sort/screen agents, and these two goals conflict. This decline in value occurs despite the monotonically increasing importance of the information in determining the principal’s expected profits. Further, we show that the peak value of information occurs at a predictable level of adverse selection. These results imply that over some range, the importance of the information will be increasing, and the value of the information will be simultaneously decreasing, in the severity of adverse selection.

報告人簡介：李少鵬，美國天普大學Fox商學院會計學博士。研究方向為分析式會計理論、公司績效、管理控制、委托代理理論、數據包絡分析，以及成本會計。研究成果發表在Journal of Accounting Research，有多篇工作論文被AAA Annual Conference和AAA MAS Conference等國際會議錄用。