時間：2020年3月26日（周四下午），15:00-16:30

地點：矚目APP會議（會議号：請有意向參加的博士生和老師聯系趙瑩老師獲取）

研讨會詳細議程：

15:00-16:30

報告：Audit Market Competition and Mandatory Audit Tendering

報告人：陸天慧

摘要：In an attempt to increase audit market competition, U.K. regulators introduced a requirement in 2012 for FTSE-350 companies to tender their audits at least once every ten years. This paper provides the first empirical evidence on the consequences of introducing mandatory tendering for companies that became subject (did not become subject) to the new tendering rule. As expected, we find an increase in audit tendering and auditor switching after companies became subject to the mandatory tendering rule. Audit fees decrease in the years when audit tendering occurs, and audit fees increase subsequent to the mandatory tendering rule in the years when tendering does not occur. Overall, we find that the net effect of introducing the tendering rule was an increase in audit fees. Thus, our findings suggest that the new mandatory tendering rule has had adverse effects on the competitiveness of the audit market, which is opposite to what regulators say they intended.

報告人簡介：

陸天慧，英國布裡斯托大學（University of Bristol）會計學博士研究生，曾赴美國南加州大學（University of Southern California）訪學。研究方向為審計、信息披露，以及基于資本市場的會計研究。